With Nicole Maestas and Carlos Dobkin
With Marion Aouad and Todd Wagner
With Jeremy West, Rob Fairlie, and Bryan Pratt
We study whether strengthening the enforcement of pecuniary policies targetingresource conservation undermines the efficacy of social pressure encouraging the sameprosocial behavior. Evaluating a large randomized field experiment across a sharpchange in policy regimes, we find that normative peer comparisons cause significanthousehold water conservation invariant to the strength of regulatory incentives forreduced landscape irrigation. Dispelling potential threats to interpretation, we confirmusing a regression discontinuity design that the enhanced enforcement binds and alsoreduces water consumption. These findings demonstrate that stronger regulations need not crowd out social pressure, an actionable insight for increasingly multidimensionalconservation policies.
With Asha Shepard (Revise and Resubmit)
This paper estimates the long-run effects of slavery in the United States in a spatial regression discontinuity design. Using the boundary between free and slave states immediately antebellum, I find that slavery decreased per capita manufacturing output by as much as 30 percent in the decades following the Civil War. Perhaps surprisingly, agricultural output and farm values were only briefly depressed in former slave states after the war. However, I show that slavery affected the structure of the economy in a given region — specifically through agricultural production decisions — and that these structures persisted long after passage of the 13th Amendment. Although emancipation ended slavery, political forces kept the institution from being completely disintegrated, and I explore channels through which this was possible. My results support mounting evidence in recent literature on the significant and lasting effects of institutions on economic development.
With Ciril Bosch-Rosa and Curtis Kephart
Using a continuous-time experimental setup, we study how well the Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation holds in its original two-dimensional (price and location) setting. By having subjects chose their location on a two dimensional plane we observe that, in general, the principle of minimum differentiation holds. Additionally, we study how different rates of adjustment affect price coordination and find that, contrary to recent literature, the ability to respond quickly does not always increases cooperation rate.
"The Effects of Skilled Nursing Facility Care: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Medicare." American Journal of Health Economics 6.1 (2020): 39-71.
"Retirement and Health: Evidence from England." Journal of Health Economics (2020): 102352.